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INTRODUCTION
In a recent court case involving famous actress and model Sofia
Vergara, her former husband, Nick Loeb, sought custody over the
embryos 1 the couple had created using assisted reproductive technology. 2
During their marriage, Vergara and Loeb underwent in vitro fertilization
(IVF) at a California clinic with the intent of producing biological children
carried through gestational surrogacy. 3 During their second round of IVF,
the couple signed a general informed consent agreement on how the
partners would proceed regarding the storage and disposition of the
cryopreserved embryos. 4 The spouses contracted that in the event of
divorce or the death of one of the parties, they would thaw the embryos
with no further action. 5 After several failed treatments, there were two
viable embryos. 6 Unfortunately, Loeb and Vergara were unable to use the
viable embryos during their marriage, as they ended their relationship
shortly after concluding the IVF process. 7 Loeb asserted that during and
after the divorce, he repeatedly attempted to communicate with Vergara
about the embryos and his desire to have them transferred to a surrogate

1. For the purposes of this Comment, embryos and preembryos are
interchangeable terms that refer to pre-implanted embryos created through IVF
procedures.
2. Loeb v. Vergara, 313 So. 3d 346, 353 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2021).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 354.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 354–55.
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for further development. 8 However, Vergara would not consent. 9 As a
result, Loeb filed a petition for custody in the Eastern District of Louisiana
on behalf of himself and the embryos. 10 In his petition, Loeb asserted that
the embryos were living children of which Loeb should be granted full
custody. 11 Loeb argued that the original contractual provision to thaw the
embryos was unenforceable and that their agreement did not govern
decisions regarding future disposition of the embryos. 12 He further
asserted that Vergara violated her “high duty of care and prudent
administration” owed to the embryos by disallowing their use. 13
While the spouses were domiciled in California and began their IVF
process there, Loeb filed suit in Louisiana because of a two-month period
that the spouses lived in Louisiana while Vergara was filming and,
presumably, also due to Louisiana’s unconventional laws governing
frozen embryos. 14 Vergara went through the Louisiana court system, up
to the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal; however, the Fourth
Circuit dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds. 15 As a result,
Louisiana courts have failed to provide guidance on how to determine the
rightful owner of an embryo when spouses and former partners are in a
dispute.
Courts across the nation have attempted to answer the questions that
arise in embryo disputes as IVF has risen in popularity over the decades. 16
For many states, the first step in determining how to resolve embryo
disputes lies in how states should classify embryos. 17 Some states classify
embryos as persons, others classify embryos as property, while other states
fall somewhere in between. 18 In Louisiana, an embryo is considered a
juridical person. 19 Louisiana law classifies all persons as either natural
persons or juridical persons. 20 Human beings are considered natural
8. Id.
9. Id. at 355.
10. Loeb v. Vergara, No. 18-3165, 2018 WL 2985319, at *1 (E.D. La. June
13, 2018).
11. Vergara, 313 So. 3d at 357.
12. Id. at 356.
13. Id. at 357.
14. Id. at 355; see LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:121–133 (2022).
15. Vergara, 313 So. 3d at 346.
16. See generally Hannah Catchings, A “Modern Family” Issue:
Recategorizing Embryos in the 21st Century, 80 LA. L. REV. 1521 (2020).
17. See generally id.
18. Id. at 1533–34.
19. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:123 (2022).
20. LA. CIV. CODE art. 24 (2022).
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persons. 21 A juridical person, by contrast, is a legal entity to whom the law
attributes personality. 22 However, the Louisiana legislature also suggests
that an embryo is a biological human being. 23 Because of this, Louisiana
courts must toggle with two inconsistent provisions of law: one that treats
a frozen embryo as a juridical person and another that treats a frozen
embryo as a natural person. 24 Confusing legislation regarding the rights of
embryos and the political, moral, and religious climate of the state also
complicate this issue. 25
Moreover, Louisiana law recognizes that embryos have certain
protections. 26 These protections are not those of a natural person but of a
legal entity. 27 The juridical person classification most notably includes
corporations and partnerships. 28 Yet, IVF patients cannot own embryos. 29
Since embryos are classified as juridical persons with their own rights and
are incapable of being owned, courts are left with minimal guidance when
determining the rights of progenitors in the use or disposal of their
embryos, particularly in divorce or death.
Although certain states have benefitted from defining embryos as
property, the Louisiana legislature would likely find this classification
inadequate. To truly resolve the disputes that arise from embryo
disposition, the legislature should clarify what it means to be a juridical
person regarding embryos and how former spouses and other individuals
seeking rights and usage of the embryos should proceed. A juridical person
cannot act on its own behalf. 30 Rather, a juridical person requires
representation. 31 Representation arises either from the law or from acts

21. Id.
22. Id.; LA. REV. STAT. § 9:123 (2022).
23. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:126 (2022).
24. See generally Loeb v. Vergara, 313 So. 3d 346 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
2021).
25. See Rosemary Westwood, Louisiana Passes Three New Anti-abortion
Bills Needing Only The Governor’s Signature To Become Law, WWNO – NEW
ORLEANS PUB. RADIO (June 10, 2021, 1:46 PM CDT), https://www.wwno.org/
public-health/2021-06-10/louisiana-passes-three-new-anti-abortion-bills-needing
-only-the-governors-signature-to-become-law [https://perma.cc/8QWH-P4QH].
26. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:125 (2022).
27. LA. CIV. CODE art. 24 (2022).
28. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 24 cmt. b (2021); Monica Hof Wallace, A Primer
on Natural and Juridical Persons in Louisiana, 64 LOY. L. REV. 407, 418 (2018).
29. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:126 (2022).
30. See BORIS STARCK, DROIT CIVIL: INTRODUCTION 74 (J.R. Trahan trans.,
2d ed. 1997) (1976).
31. Id.
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that have given birth to the juridical person. 32 Progenitors are given
representative rights, but these rights should provide more expansive
options for disposition. 33
Further, the legislature should revise the language of Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 9:131 to better instruct courts on how to resolve embryo
disputes. Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:131 states that courts should
determine embryo disposition in the best interest of the embryos. 34
However, the legislature does not describe what this best interest standard
is and how courts are to apply it. To remedy this, the legislature should
adopt specific language providing first, that party intent governs the
resolution of embryo disputes. Second, when there is no contract, courts
must conduct a fact-intensive balancing test of the interests of the
progenitors, as demonstrated in Davis v. Davis, 35 a foundational Tennessee
case on the resolution of embryo disputes. Adopting this language would
emphasize the importance of contracts between progenitors and IVF
clinics, as well as provide courts with actionable steps on how to resolve
these disputes.
Part I of this Comment will discuss the basics of IVF and how assisted
reproductive technology interacts within Louisiana law of property and
personhood. Part II will dissect the importance of Loeb v. Vergara and
demonstrate why the Human Embryo Statutes are not meeting the needs
of progenitors. Part III will consider how different states opt to classify
embryos and resolve disputes between former spouses. Part IV will
suggest legislative changes in making embryo disposition more efficient
and less burdensome on the parties, clinics, and courts. To do so, this part
will suggest that the legislature broaden the Human Embryo Statutes to
grant disposition rights to progenitors and create clear language for courts
to resolve future embryo disputes through contractual enforcement and a
balancing test.
I. IVF, LOUISIANA’S CLASSIFICATIONS OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY,
AND HOW THAT IMPACTS THE CLASSIFICATION OF EMBRYOS
Louisiana’s current statutory provisions for persons and property
illustrate potential resolutions for classification of embryos. Louisiana
32. Id. “These powers [of representation] arise either from the law or from
the acts that have given birth to the moral person [i.e., juridical person] (the
constitution and by-laws of an association, a society, etc.).” Id.
33. For the purposes of this Comment, the term progenitors refers to the
intended users of the embryo. See Wallace, supra note 28, at 417–18.
34. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:131 (2022).
35. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
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classifies embryos as neither natural persons nor property; instead,
embryos exist somewhere in between. 36 In determining the optimal
classification of embryos, it is valuable to perform an analysis of how both
a personhood and property classification would impact embryo disputes.
Addressing how embryos would operate as property illustrates the gaps
within the Human Embryo Statutes and how legislators can revise the
juridical personhood language to better prepare courts to resolve embryo
disputes.
A. The Basics of IVF
In natural or unassisted conception, the fertilization of eggs occurs
inside of a fallopian tube. 37 Then, the fertilized egg attaches to the lining
of the uterus and continues to grow into a fetus over a nine-month period. 38
However, couples may use special medical techniques called assisted
reproductive technology (ART) to help an individual become pregnant. 39
In vitro fertilization (IVF) is a form of ART that widely increases
reproductive opportunities for spouses, partners, and individuals. 40 IVF is
the joining of gametes—an egg and sperm—in a laboratory dish. 41 In the
early stages of IVF, the biological female will take medication that will
increase egg production. 42 A doctor will then perform a minor surgery to
remove the eggs. 43 Then, the doctor mixes the best quality eggs with
sperm, known as insemination of the eggs. 44 After insemination, the
gametes stay in an environmentally controlled chamber. 45 When the egg
is fertilized, it becomes a zygote. 46 Once the zygote divides, it becomes an

36. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:125 (2022). Like natural persons, juridical
persons have rights and duties. Yet, juridical persons are subject to the control of
the natural persons that preside over it, much like property. See LA. CIV. CODE
art. 76 (2022); Wallace, supra note 28, at 418; STARCK, supra note 30, at 74.
37. Sian Ferguson, 10 Things to Know About Fertilization, HEALTHLINE
(Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.healthline.com/health/where-does-fertilization-occur
[https://perma.cc/9A4G-UGDP].
38. In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), MEDLINEPLUS, https://medlineplus.gov/ency
/article/007279.htm [https://perma.cc/45XM-PLV5] (last visited Oct. 7, 2022).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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embryo. 47 Physicians generally place embryos into the biological female’s
uterus three to five days after egg retrieval and fertilization. 48 However, as
demonstrated in Vergara, one can decide to freeze unused embryos to
implant at a later date.49
B. Louisiana Property
Certain jurisdictions have found benefits in classifying embryos as
property. 50 In Louisiana, property generally refers to objects that have a
pecuniary value as well as the rights that persons have with respect to
property including ownership, servitudes, and leases. 51 The legal concept
of property is thought to include ownership as an exclusive right to control
an economic good, whether corporeal or incorporeal. 52
Classifying a thing as corporeal or incorporeal is valuable, especially
when determining the division of things into movables and immovables. 53
Corporeals are things that have a body, whether animate or inanimate, and
can be felt or touched. 54 Inherent to disputes over the ownership of
embryos, most cases will involve two parties seeking rights and usage of
the embryo. Under Louisiana law, ownership of the same thing by two or
more persons is ownership in indivision. 55
Regarding the division of things, Louisiana distinguishes divisibles
from indivisibles. 56 A thing is divisible if one can divide it into several
parts of equal kind without reduction of its value. 57 Generally, land is
divisible, as it can be divided equally in a way that does not reduce the
value of the property. 58 Conversely, movables are generally indivisible. 59
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016); Roman
v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex. App. 2006).
51. A.N. YIANNOPOULOS & RONALD J. SCALISE, PROPERTY, in 2 LOUISIANA
CIVIL LAW TREATISE § 1:1 (5th ed. 2021).
52. Id.
53. Id. § 2.15.
54. LA. CIV. CODE art. 461 (2022).
55. Id. art. 797.
56. YIANNOPOULOS & SCALISE, supra note 51, § 2.19.
57. Id.
58. See id. “Lands may be susceptible of judicial partition in kind depending
on their nature, the character of improvements thereon, adaptability to farming or
other uses, accessibility of each lot to a public road, and several other
considerations.” Id.
59. Id.
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Movables, such as a car or a boat, cannot be divided into equal parts
without a reduction in its value. 60 When individuals share ownership of an
indivisible thing, the portion of each co-owner is distinct, certain, and
presumed to be equal. 61 When deciding upon the usage or management of
a thing held in indivision, all co-owners must agree. 62 A co-owner is
entitled to use the thing held in indivision but may not prevent another coowner from making such use of it. 63 At any point, a co-owner has the right
to demand partition of the thing held in indivision. 64 All co-owners can
agree on the mode of partition, or in the absence of such agreement, a coowner may demand judicial partition. 65 Further, if co-owners cannot agree
on the use and management of a thing and partition is unavailable, such as
in the case of a movable, which cannot be partitioned, a court may
determine the use and management when petitioned by a co-owner. 66
Partition becomes more complicated with embryos, particularly in regard
to partition of embryos within the community property regime.
1. The Community Property Regime
If embryos are classified as property, it follows that embryos created
during marriage could be subject to the community property regime.
Louisiana is a community property state that distinguishes property
acquired prior to the marriage from property acquired during the
marriage.67 Property a spouse acquires prior to the marriage or with
separate funds is separate property. 68 Under the community property
regime, married spouses each own a one-half interest in the property they
acquire during the marriage. 69 However, separate property acquired prior
to marriage belongs exclusively to that spouse. 70 Additionally, inheritance
and individual donations are all classified as separate property. 71 Louisiana
law presumes that things acquired during a marriage are community
60. See id. § 7.46. “Corporeal movables are things, whether animate or
inanimate, that normally move or can be moved from one place to another.” Id.
61. Id. § 2.19; LA. CIV. CODE art. 797 (2022).
62. LA. CIV. CODE art. 801 (2022).
63. Id. art. 802.
64. See id. art. 807.
65. Id. art. 809.
66. Id. art. 803.
67. Id. art. 2338.
68. Id. art. 2341.
69. See generally id. art. 2338.
70. Id. art. 2341.
71. Id.
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property; however, either spouse may prove that the property is separate
property. 72 Applying the laws of the community property regime to
embryos illustrates further difficulties in resolving embryo disputes. When
married couples within the community property regime undergo IVF,
there is the possibility that if the embryo is property, the embryo would be
community property. Instead of classifying embryos as property,
Louisiana classifies embryos as persons.
C. Louisiana’s Classification of Persons
In Louisiana, two kinds of persons are defined within the Louisiana
Civil Code: natural persons and juridical persons. 73 A natural person is a
human being. 74 Natural persons hold the general legal capacity to have
rights and duties. 75 Natural personality commences from the moment of
live birth and terminates at death. 76
A juridical person is an entity to which the law attributes personality,
such as a corporation, a partnership, or a ship. 77 While juridical
personhood generally does not encompass things with the potential for life,
at its core, juridical personhood is a thing that requires representation. 78
Civilian doctrine acknowledges that certain persons, despite having the
enjoyment of rights, cannot exercise those rights themselves. 79 This is
particularly true with juridical persons. 80 By being abstract persons,
juridical entities by their nature are “stricken with an incapacity of
exercise.” 81 As a result, a juridical person can only act through the
intervention of a natural person who has the power to represent it. 82 For
example, limited liability companies exist as beings separate from their
owners. 83 However, one or several managers act on behalf of the LLC,
controlling its daily operations. 84 Powers of representation arise either
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. art. 2340.
Id. art. 24.
Id. art. 25.
Id. art. 27.
Id. art. 24.
Wallace, supra note 28, at 418.
See id.
STARCK, supra note 30, at 74.
Id.
Id.
Id.
SUSAN KALINKA ET AL., LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES &
PARTNERSHIPS: A GUIDE TO BUSINESS & TAX PLANNING, in 9 LOUISIANA CIVIL
LAW TREATISE § 1:24 (4th ed. 2021).
84. Id.
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from the law or from the acts that have given birth to the juridical person. 85
Therefore, for a juridical person, unable to act on its own behalf, to have
its rights properly advocated for, there must be a legal representative. The
parties best suited to be the embryo representatives are the progenitors who
have control over the usage and disposition of the embryos. The existence
of frozen embryos created through IVF further illustrates the importance
of representation.
D. Louisiana’s Classification of Embryos
In Louisiana, a human embryo is defined as an “in vitro fertilized
human ovum . . . composed of one or more living human cells and human
genetic material so unified and organized that it will develop in utero into
an unborn child.” 86 Human embryos are considered juridical persons and
have certain rights granted by law. 87 Existence of the juridical person is
based on the law, which gives the embryo its personality. 88 Thus, the
existence of such personality is governed by the Human Embryo Statutes,
specifically Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:123. 89
Though embryos are not classified as natural persons, Louisiana’s
definitions of birth and death of natural persons conflict with the Human
Embryo Statutes. Pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article 26, an unborn
child is considered a natural person for whatever interests it has from the
moment of conception. 90 For example, an unborn child may be a plaintiff
in an action for the protection of its property rights, or if the child is born
dead, it is considered a person for the purpose of the parent’s wrongful
death action. 91 Comment b to article 26 provides that an unborn child may
be a person even if it is in a test tube rather than a mother’s womb. 92 Under
this provision, it would appear that an embryo that is created “in a test
tube” is a natural person under Louisiana law. 93 However, this is not the

85. STARCK, supra note 30, at 74.
86. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:121 (2022).
87. Id.
88. LA. CIV. CODE art. 24 (2022).
89. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:123 (2022) (“An in vitro fertilized human ovum exists
as a juridical person until such time as the in vitro fertilized ovum is implanted in
the womb; or at any other time when rights attach to an unborn child in accordance
with law.”).
90. LA. CIV. CODE art. 26 (2022).
91. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 26 cmt. c (2021); id. art. 26 cmt. d.
92. Id. art. 26 cmt. b.
93. LA. CIV. CODE art. 26 (2022).
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case. 94 In 1986, the Louisiana legislature enacted the Human Embryo
Statutes, which establishes that an embryo is a juridical person until
implantation or at any other time when rights attach to an unborn child. 95
The Human Embryo Statutes attempt to meet the needs of couples who
wish to take advantage of IVF services, encourage the use of those
services, and provide legal recognition for embryos as juridical persons. 96
While juridical persons are generally capable of being owned, this is
not the case for embryos. 97 The progenitors, the treating physician, and the
facility that employs the treating physician cannot own the embryos. 98
Under Louisiana law, it would appear that no one owns embryos. 99
However, the IVF patients do owe a high duty of care and prudent
administration to the embryos. 100 This duty suggests that the progenitors
are the embryos’ representatives. 101 Representative rights are particularly
important because IVF procedures often result in left-over, unused
embryos. 102 The IVF process may require multiple cycles to have a
successful pregnancy. 103 As a method of minimizing invasive and costly
surgeries, IVF clinics often allow couples to cryopreserve embryos. 104
This means that the clinics will freeze the embryos until a later date. 105
Clinics generally enter into formal written agreements with couples prior
to beginning the IVF process to determine what will happen to the
resulting embryos. 106 The agreements often contain four options: (1)
reserving the embryos for future use; (2) disposing of the embryos; (3)
donating the embryos to a different couple or individual; or (4) donating
the embryos to research. 107 These contracts may also include a specific
option for death of a party, divorce, refusal to continue the IVF program,

94. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 26 cmt. g (2021).
95. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:123 (2022).
96. Loeb v. Vergara, 313 So. 3d 346, 391 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2021).
97. LA. CIV. CODE art. 26 (2022).
98. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:126 (2022).
99. See generally id. § 9:130.
100. Id. § 9:126.
101. Id.
102. See Olivia Lin, Bioethics and the Disposition of Cryopreserved
Preembryos: Why Autonomy-Based Contract Theory Does Not Work, 34 FAM.
ADVOC. 38, 38 (2011).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 39.
107. Id.
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or termination of the agreement.108 However, in Louisiana, these options
are even more limited due to the Human Embryo Statutes. 109
While this representation establishes certain rights for embryos, these
rights are limited. As representatives, progenitors may only implant,
donate, or freeze the embryo indefinitely. 110 Progenitors have the strongest
interest in the embryos, as the embryos are their genetic material and, for
many, their last hope at having biological children. 111 The decisions
surrounding IVF procedures are incredibly personal to the progenitors.
The Human Embryo Statutes attempt to ease the concerns of the
progenitors, but in practice, the statutes are severely lacking.
II. NOT ALL IT’S CRACKED UP TO BE: THE HUMAN EMBRYO STATUTES
IN APPLICATION
Although the legislature enacted the Human Embryo Statutes in 1986,
the first and only case addressing its inadequacies was Loeb v. Vergara,
which first came before the Louisiana 24th Judicial District located in
Jefferson Parish in 2018. 112 The Vergara court demonstrated the struggle
between the intent of the Human Embryo Statutes and the difficulty in
applying it. 113 The law’s ambiguity creates a sequence of problems that
result in courts being unable to adequately rule on embryo disputes.
A. Loeb v. Vergara
During Vergara and Loeb’s marriage, the couple created embryos
through IVF with the intent to have the embryos implanted into a
gestational surrogate. 114 Despite their original agreement stating that the
spouses would thaw the embryos in the case of divorce, Loeb sought usage
of the embryos to continue with the couple’s plan for surrogacy after the
dissolution of their marriage. 115 While the Louisiana Fourth Circuit was
unable to definitively determine who had the right to use embryos amidst
108. Id.
109. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:129 (2022).
110. Id. §§ 9:129–130.
111. See Britney Glaser, The Fertility Dilemma: Frozen Embryos, KPLC
NEWS (Mar. 27, 2009, 7:57 AM CDT), https://www.kplctv.com/story/10081861/
the-fertility-dilemma-frozen-embryos/ [https://perma.cc/S77A-NREB].
112. Loeb v. Vergara, 313 So. 3d 346, 386 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2021); see
LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:121–133 (2022).
113. See generally Vergara, 313 So. 3d 346.
114. Id. at 353.
115. Id. at 355.
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divorce disputes due to jurisdictional issues, the court conducted an
analysis of the Human Embryo Statutes in pari materia with the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), a uniform
act adopted by most U.S. states that specifies which court should have
jurisdiction to decide cases involving child custody. 116 Loeb sued for child
custody over the embryos, asserting the embryos are children under
Louisiana law. 117 In order for the Louisiana court to grant custody to Loeb,
he needed to prove first, that the embryos were children and second, that
the embryos were domiciled in Louisiana. 118
Under Louisiana law, a child is defined as “an individual who has not
attained eighteen years of age.” 119 Children, as human beings, are natural
persons. 120 While the Human Embryo Statutes classify embryos as
juridical persons, the statutes also state that “[a]n [IVF] ovum is a
biological human being.” 121 Therefore, the court noted that the statutes
define embryos as both a juridical and natural person. 122
To resolve this ambiguity, the court examined the legislative intent
behind the Human Embryo Statutes. 123 During the Senate Judiciary A
Committee Meeting, committee members stated that the goal of the
statutes was to “meet the needs of couples who wish to take advantage of
fertilization clinic services . . . and provide legal recognition for the
[embryo] under a conceptual frame-work of a juridical person.” 124 This
legislative history indicates that embryos are to be classified as a third
juridical person. However, the court also noted, “there is no clear
definition as [to] what this ‘third juridical person’ category explicitly
means” in comparison to other traditional types of juridical persons. 125 At
the end of its analysis, the court was still unsure as to whether the
legislature intended to classify embryos as exclusively juridical persons or
as natural persons. 126 What the court was sure of, however, was that a

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 386.
119. LA. REV. STAT. § 13:1802.2 (2022).
120. LA. CIV. CODE art. 24 (2022).
121. Vergara, 313 So. 3d at 387 (alteration in original) (citing LA. REV. STAT.
§ 9:126 (2021)).
122. Id. at 387.
123. Id. at 388–89.
124. Id. at 389 (citing Louisiana State Judiciary A Committee Minutes, May
13, 1986).
125. Id. at 391 (emphasis added).
126. Id.
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human embryo is not a child. 127 Specifically, the court stated, “While the
Human Embryo Statutes clearly carve out the embryos as human, they stop
short of referring to the embryos as ‘children’ . . . .” 128 The Human Embryo
Statutes do not refer to embryos as children until after the embryo is
implanted into the womb, which was not at issue in Vergara. 129
Nonetheless, it is evident that embryos, under the Human Embryo Statutes,
are not children. 130 The court found that its analysis of the Human Embryo
Statutes alongside UCCJEA jurisprudence, which demonstrates that
parents cannot be granted custody of the unborn, was enough to find that
embryos are not children and, thus, not subject to child custody disputes. 131
Since embryos are not children, the UCCJEA was inapplicable, and the
court found that Louisiana did not have jurisdiction to make a ruling based
on child custody. 132 Therefore, even though Louisiana law deems embryos
as persons, it does not deem embryos as children. 133
B. The Difficulties of Applying the Human Embryo Statutes in Vergara
The Vergara court was unable to apply the Human Embryo Statutes
to determine the rightful owner of the embryos; however, even in the
absence of jurisdictional issues, the court would have likely struggled with
how to resolve this dispute. Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:131 states, “In
disputes arising between any parties regarding the in vitro fertilized ovum,
the judicial standard for resolving such disputes is to be in the best interest
of the in vitro fertilized ovum.” 134 However, the statute does not explain
or list factors for considering what is in the best interest of the embryo. 135
The best interest standard is used throughout the Louisiana Civil Code,
perhaps most notably used and defined in family law. 136 However, the best
127. Id.
128. Id. (emphasis added).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 392.
133. Id.
134. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:131 (2022).
135. See generally id.
136. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 131, 134 (2022). Louisiana Civil Code article 134
lists 14 illustrative factors for courts to consider in family law cases. The factors
weigh the guardian’s ability to care for the child and provide a stable environment,
amongst other similar considerations. Article 134 requires courts to consider all
relevant factors in determining the best interest of the child, including:
(1) The potential for the child to be abused, as defined by Children’s
Code Article 603, which shall be the primary consideration.
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interest standard used for child custody cases would not be appropriate for
determining usage of the embryo. Throughout the Human Embryo
Statutes, the legislature references the future, parent-child relationship
between the embryo and the progenitors. 137 Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 9:126 states that when progenitors express their identity, they retain their
parental rights over the embryo. 138 When crafting Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:131, the legislature was likely referring to the best interest of
the child factors that courts reference and weigh in family law disputes,
particularly in child custody proceedings. 139 However, since there are no
(2) The love, affection, and other emotional ties between each party and
the child.
(3) The capacity and disposition of each party to give the child love,
affection, and spiritual guidance and to continue the education and
rearing of the child.
(4) The capacity and disposition of each party to provide the child with
food, clothing, medical care, and other material needs.
(5) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, adequate
environment, and the desirability of maintaining continuity of that
environment.
(6) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed
custodial home or homes.
(7) The moral fitness of each party, insofar as it affects the welfare of the
child.
(8) The history of substance abuse, violence, or criminal activity of any
party.
(9) The mental and physical health of each party. Evidence that an
abused parent suffers from the effects of past abuse by the other parent
shall not be grounds for denying that parent custody.
(10) The home, school, and community history of the child.
(11) The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child
to be of sufficient age to express a preference.
(12) The willingness and ability of each party to facilitate and encourage
a close and continuing relationship between the child and the other party,
except when objectively substantial evidence of specific abusive,
reckless, or illegal conduct has caused one party to have reasonable
concerns for the child’s safety or well-being while in the care of the other
party.
(13) The distance between the respective residences of the parties.
(14) The responsibility for the care and rearing of the child previously
exercised by each party.
Id. art. 134.
137. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:126–130 (2022).
138. Id. § 9:126.
139. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 131, 134 (2022).
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further comments for the statute, it is unknown what the legislature truly
intended. Regardless, as the Vergara court demonstrated, Louisiana law
does not establish that embryos are children.140 Therefore, an application
of the best interest of the child factors would be misplaced. As a result of
this, courts are left with an ambiguous standard of the best interest of the
embryo.
Additionally, Vergara illustrates the limited disposition options
available for progenitors in Louisiana. In Louisiana, if parties no longer
want to or are unable to use the embryos for themselves, they have only
two options: to donate the embryos to another couple or to freeze the
embryos indefinitely. 141 Louisiana law does not allow progenitors to
donate their embryos to science or dispose of the embryos. 142 These two
existing options are insufficient. Most couples who go through IVF
procedures do not want to donate their remaining embryos to another
couple because IVF couples do not want someone else raising their
biological children. 143 Additionally, IVF couples do not want their existing
children worrying about encountering an unknown sibling someday. 144
While donation is sufficient and some progenitors utilize donation, the
limited disposition options put progenitors in an unfortunate position.
Not being able to dispose of one’s own genetic material creates
challenges for parties involved in IVF procedures. 145 Having to keep
embryos frozen indefinitely instead of disposing of them creates an
increased burden on the parties involved in IVF procedures. 146 Because of
the special circumstances necessary for cryopreserved embryos, having to
store thousands of unused embryos creates an excessive burden on IVF
clinics and storage facilities. 147 In Louisiana, there are embryos that have
been in cryopreservation since the late 1980s; doctors know that most of
the original progenitors will not claim or use these embryos. 148 Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 9:127 holds any physician or medical facility that
participates in the IVF process responsible for the safekeeping of the
embryos, which means that while these embryos are stored for decades,
140. Loeb v. Vergara, 313 So. 3d 346, 392 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2021).
141. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:129–130 (2022).
142. Id.
143. Denise Grady, Parents Torn Over Fate of Frozen Embryos, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 4, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/04/us/04embryo.html
[https://perma.cc/BES6-LK7D].
144. Id.
145. Glaser, supra note 111.
146. Id.
147. See id.; Grady, supra note 143.
148. Glaser, supra note 111.
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the primary liability rests on clinics and doctors. 149 Further, clinics that
currently offer the option to store embryos indefinitely require payment to
store the embryos. 150 These fees for storage can range from hundreds to
thousands of dollars annually. 151 If spouses contract to dispose of their
embryos yet are restricted by current laws, they could be paying these
yearly fees for the rest of their lives.
Although IVF is a procedure that increases opportunity for pregnancy,
it does have risks. 152 A biological female taking fertility medication will
often have various adverse side effects throughout the process. 153
Additionally, IVF is a costly procedure. 154 Some health insurance
companies offer coverage, but many do not. 155 The total costs for IVF in
Louisiana is between $12,000 to $17,000 excluding medication and
testing. 156 In the United States, only 17 states offer IVF treatments, with
Louisiana being one of them. 157 Currently, there are five fertility clinics in
Louisiana with several offices located in major metropolitan areas such as
New Orleans, Baton Rouge, Shreveport, and Lafayette. 158 IVF treatment
requires a significant financial investment and may cause physical, mental,
and emotional burdens. 159 Due to the unique and sensitive nature of IVF
embryos, the Louisiana legislature sought to provide guidelines for
progenitors and protection for embryos through the Human Embryo
Statutes. 160 However, the statutes are not meeting the needs of the
progenitors. In resolving the issues that arise within the Human Embryo
Statutes, Louisiana should look to how other states resolve disputes in
149. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:127 (2022).
150. Rachel Gurevich, Options for What to Do With Extra Frozen Embryos
After IVF, VERYWELLFAMILY (Feb. 19, 2021), https://www.verywellfamily.com/
extra-embryos-after-ivf-what-are-your-options-1960215 [https://perma.cc/6Z5RF7Y9].
151. Id.
152. See In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), supra note 38.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.; How Much Does IVF Cost in Louisiana? Average IVF Cost,
Insurance and Financing Options, IVF AUTHORITY, https://www.ivfauthority
.com/ivf-cost-in-louisiana/ [https://perma.cc/BCF7-5MQS] (last visited June 5,
2022).
157. How Much Does IVF Cost in Louisiana?, supra note 156.
158. Fertility Clinics in Louisiana, IVF AUTHORITY, https://www.ivfauthority
.com/ivf-clinics/usa/louisiana/ [https://perma.cc/UL3L-XN3W] (last visited July
16, 2022).
159. In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), supra note 38.
160. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:123 (2022).
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creating an actionable judicial procedure in Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 9:131.
III. THE HISTORY OF EMBRYO DISPUTES AND OTHER STATES’
SOLUTIONS
Embryo disposition overlaps with multiple areas within the law and,
as a result, state legislatures and courts have had to create innovative
solutions. 161 Certain courts adopt a property approach when categorizing
embryos; however, pro-life advocates argue that embryos should not be
classified as property due to the embryos’ potential for life. 162 Throughout
the decades, other states have attempted to resolve embryo disputes with
varying classification schemes and approaches. 163 The following sections
illustrate the options that Louisiana can adopt to better resolve future
embryo disputes.
When courts resolve disputes over the disposition of embryos, courts
generally employ one of three approaches: (1) a contractual approach; (2)
a contemporaneous-mutual-consent approach; or (3) a balancing
approach. 164 In the contractual approach, a court will focus on what the
parties contracted regarding the usage of the embryos. 165 Courts typically
enforce the parties’ agreement unless it violates the state’s public policy.166
One criticism of the contract approach is its rigidity to unforeseen
events. 167 A party unwilling to use the embryos may be forced into
parenthood against his or her wishes merely because the contractual
agreement stated to do so, which may have been arranged while the
spouses were married and likely not anticipating divorce. 168 In these cases
161. See Andrea Fischer, Solomon and in Vitro Fertilization: Characterization
and Division of Embryos in the Case of Divorce, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
262, 262 (2000).
162. Derek Mergele-Rust, Splitting the Baby: The Implications of Classifying
Pre-Embryos as Community Property in Divorce Proceedings and Its Impacts on
Gestational Surrogacy Agreements, 8 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 505, 522
(2016).
163. See generally Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); Szafranski
v. Dunston, 993 N.E.2d 502 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013); In re Marriage of Witten, 672
N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003).
164. See Szafranski, 993 N.E.2d at 506.
165. Id.
166. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d at 776).
167. Mergele-Rust, supra note 162, at 523 (citing Szafranski, 993 N.E.2d at
507).
168. Szafranski, 993 N.E.2d at 507.
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where the parties’ interests have changed, the court may not be willing to
create a new ruling. 169 Instead, the contract controls. 170
Under the contemporaneous-mutual-consent approach, neither party
is permitted to use the existing embryo without the mutual consent of both
parties who created the embryo. 171 With this approach, a contract the
parties drafted prior to the divorce would not be binding. 172 However,
many believe this approach is unrealistic because if the parties agreed on
an alternate remedy, they would not be in court. 173
Finally, the balancing approach attempts to enforce the pre-existing
contract between the parties, but in the absence of a pre-existing contract,
the court weighs the parties’ interests. 174 Under this approach, the court
considers specific facts and circumstances in reaching its conclusion, such
as whether the remaining embryos are one party’s last remaining
opportunity for reproduction. 175 However, unless the legislature
intervenes, this approach gives courts no concrete guidelines to follow. 176
As stated, Louisiana has no jurisprudence that addresses how to
resolve embryo disputes. However, many other states have had the
opportunity to resolve this issue. 177 Since the contract approach and the
contemporaneous-mutual-consent approach present significant obstacles,
Louisiana should look to states that have adopted the balancing approach
to remedy its statutory shortfalls in resolving embryo disputes.
A. The Balancing Approach—The Right to Life vs. The Right (Not) to
Procreate
The Tennessee Supreme Court 1992 decision of Davis v. Davis was
one of the first cases to address disposition of embryos after divorce. 178 In
Davis, two spouses began the IVF process early in their marriage. 179
Unlike typical, modern protocol for IVF procedures, the parties did not
169. Id. at 512.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 510.
172. Id. at 510–11.
173. Id. at 511.
174. Id. at 512.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); McQueen v. Gadberry,
507 S.W.3d 127 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016); Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d 40 (Tex.
App. 2006).
178. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589.
179. Id. at 591.
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have an agreement governing the disposition of embryos. 180 Additionally,
Tennessee had no legislation regarding the disposition of embryos. 181
After their divorce, the wife sought to use the embryos for herself while
the husband wanted to either freeze until a later date or discard of the
embryos. 182 The trial court found that the embryos were human beings and
thus, children at the time of fertilization. 183 Since the wife wanted to bring
the embryos to term, the court granted her custody. 184 The Tennessee
appellate court promptly reversed this decision and stated that there was
no state interest to justify allowing implantation without the approval of
either party. 185 The court of appeals held that the parties had a shared
interest in the embryos and, thus, were entitled to joint control and an
“equal voice over their disposition.” 186
The Tennessee Supreme Court relied heavily on legal journals and
legislative comments in its proposed method that parties’ interests must be
weighed to resolve embryo disputes “in a fair and responsible manner.” 187
However, the Court first considered whether embryos fit within a
personhood or property classification. 188 The Court agreed with the court
of appeals in finding that embryos are not persons under Tennessee law. 189
Under Tennessee’s Wrongful Death Statute, there is no recovery for a
fetus unless it is born alive because “[w]ithout live birth . . . a fetus is not
a ‘person’ within the meaning of the statute.” 190 Further, “the United States
Supreme Court explicitly refused to hold that the fetus possesses
independent rights under law . . . . ‘[T]he unborn have never been
recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense.’” 191 Even under the
recent U.S. Supreme Court decision of Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health
Organization, which struck down the precedent of Roe v. Wade, embryos

180. Id. at 588, 590; Lin, supra note 102, at 39.
181. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 589.
184. Id.
185. Id. (citing Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 WL 130807, at *2 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Sept. 13, 1990)).
186. Id. (quoting Davis, 1990 WL 130807, at *3).
187. Id. at 591.
188. Id. at 593.
189. Id. at 594.
190. Id. (citing Davis, 1990 WL 130807, at *2).
191. Id. at 595 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973)).
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are not granted federal independent rights. 192 Rather, states are tasked with
determining rights surrounding the unborn. 193
The Tennessee trial court reached its finding by relying on the fact that
classifying embryos as persons would potentially lead to an outlaw of IVF
programs. 194 Conversely, the court struggled to classify embryos as
property. 195 Rather, embryos “occupy an interim category that entitles
them to special respect because of their potential for human life.” 196
Similarly to Louisiana, Tennessee recognized the unique difficulties in
categorizing embryos as merely property or merely persons.
Instead of resolving the classification argument, the Court came to its
conclusion on the basis of a constitutional analysis of bodily autonomy
and the right of procreation. 197 Within both the Tennessee and U.S.
Constitutions, the right to procreate “is a vital part of an individual’s right
to privacy . . . inherent in our most basic concepts of liberty . . . .” 198
Further, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that “parental autonomy is
basic to the structure of our society because the family is ‘the institution
by which we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values,
morals and cultural.’” 199 However, this right is not only limited to the right
to procreate but also the right to avoid procreation, of which both are
equally significant. 200 Although women generally experience greater
physical and emotional hardship during the IVF process, the Court
perceived both progenitors as equivalent. 201 The Court stated that “the
existence of the right itself dictates that decisional authority rests in the
[progenitors] alone . . . .” 202 While state involvement was not pertinent to
this case, the Court noted that the state may argue that because of embryos’
potential for life, the state had an interest in classifying embryos as
persons. 203 The Davis Court denied this argument because of the
192. See Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022).
193. Id. at 2284.
194. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 595.
195. See id. at 597.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 600–03.
198. Id. at 600–01. See Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Wis. v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the
Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622 (1979).
199. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601 (citing Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 634).
200. Id. at 590, 601.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 602.
203. Id.
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developmental stage of embryos. 204 Tennessee precedent solidified that a
“state’s interests do not become sufficiently compelling in the abortion
context until the end of the first trimester . . . .” 205 Therefore, because the
embryos are both pre-implantation and pre-development, the Tennessee
Supreme Court held that no state interest overcomes that of the
progenitors. 206 Any interest the state may have does not warrant
infringement upon the freedom of individuals “to make their own
decisions as to whether to allow a process to continue that may result in
such a dramatic change in their lives as becoming parents.” 207 Because
parentage is deeply personal and impactful, individuals have a greater
interest in determining what to do with their embryos.
For more efficient resolution in determining which spouse, if either,
has a right to use the embryos, Davis held that the contractual agreement
of the progenitors shall govern. 208 If the progenitors are seeking a different
method of disposition not listed in their prior agreement, courts shall first
look to the progenitor’s preferences. 209 For example, if the parties
originally contracted to thaw unused embryos in the event of divorce but
during divorce proceedings agree to donate the embryos, the Court would
honor the parties’ preference to donate. If there is no consensus between
the progenitors, the Court would hold that the established agreement
concerning disposition shall be carried out. 210 Alternatively, if there is no
agreement, the relative interests of the parties would be weighed. The
Court in Davis held that, generally, “the party wishing to avoid procreation
should prevail, assuming that the other party has a reasonable possibility
of achieving parenthood by means other than use of the preembryos in
question.” 211 Reasonable means refers not only to achieving parenthood
by means of biological children, such as through IVF, but also to achieving
parenthood through adoption. 212 If there is no other reasonable method of
procreation, the circumstances surrounding the individual seeking usage
of the embryos shall be considered in determining whether a progenitor
should be granted usage of the embryo. 213

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.
Id. (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-201 (1992)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 603–04.
Id. at 604.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Since the spouses in Davis failed to create an agreement regarding the
disposition of the embryos, the Court began its analysis by evaluating the
relative interest of the parties. 214 Usage of the embryos against the former
husband’s consent would “impose unwanted parenthood on him, with all
of its possible financial and psychological consequences.” 215 Conversely,
the decision not to use the embryos would “impose on [the former wife]
the burden of knowing that the lengthy IVF procedures she underwent
were futile, and that the [embryos] to which she contributed genetic
material would never become children.” 216 Between the initial filing of the
case and the Tennessee Supreme Court decision, the ex-wife instead
wanted to donate the embryos to another couple rather than use the
embryos for herself. 217 The Court found that because of this shift, her
interest was not as significant as her former husband’s interest in avoiding
parenthood. 218 The Court noted, however, that determining usage of the
embryo would be more difficult to decide if she could not achieve
parenthood by any other reasonable means. 219 As a result, the parties never
used the embryos. 220
Although the Davis opinion is 30 years old, it remains an important
and frequently referenced opinion in embryo dispute cases across the
country. 221 However, the holding of Davis was not immediately accepted
by all. 222 In Kass v. Kass, a New York trial court reasoned against the
burden of consideration of Davis. 223 While Davis held that the biological
female does not have a greater interest in the embryo due to the increased
risks and difficulties,224 Kass held that the female progenitor should have
the final say. 225 The New York trial court supported this choice by giving
credence to the argument that when the male progenitor enrolls in the IVF
214. Id.
215. Id. at 603.
216. Id. at 604.
217. Id. at 590.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See id. at 605. The Tennessee Supreme Court ordered the fertility clinic
to follow its normal procedure for disposing of unused embryos, which was
usually discarding or donating to research.
221. See McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016); Roman
v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d. 40 (Tex. App. 2006).
222. See generally Kass v. Kass, 19658/93, 1995 WL 110368 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Jan. 18, 1995), rev’d, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997), aff’d, 696 N.E.2d
174 (N.Y. 1998).
223. See Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *4.
224. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601.
225. See Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *5.
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program, he is aware of the potential outcome. 226 As a result, he waived
his right to avoid procreation, which the court analogized to the waiver
that occurs after natural intercourse. 227 The trial court in Kass argued that
the male progenitor should have known of the possibility of delayed
implantation. 228 The trial court reasoned that this approach not only creates
a streamlined solution for future courts but will also require parties to
consider more seriously their decision in going forward with IVF. 229
In Kass and its subsequent history, New York courts found the lower
court’s decision to be highly controversial, which ultimately resulted in
the New York Court of Appeals reversing the lower court’s ruling. 230 New
York’s highest court established that, like Davis, if there is a contract
governing the disposition of embryos, the contract controls. 231 The New
York Court of Appeals relied heavily on Davis in its finding that
agreements between progenitors should be “presumed valid and binding,
and enforced in any dispute between them.” 232 Enforcement of IVF
agreements is valuable to both the parties and the courts—namely that
enforcement greatly reduces litigation costs. 233 The Court encouraged
parties to think deeply about their agreement before beginning IVF yet
also acknowledged that contracting around such forward thinking issues
can be difficult. 234 However, the Court found that the benefit of a
streamlined approach is greater than the initial difficulty that arises from
contracting. 235 As science progresses, the lifespan of cryopreserved
embryos is unknown, perhaps indefinite. 236 Kass echoed Davis in its
position that “[t]o the extent possible, it should be the progenitors—not
the State and not the courts—who by their prior directive make this deeply
personal life choice.” 237 Creating a contract that is true to the parties’ intent
allows for courts to apply the ruling that is most consistent to the
preference of the progenitors, which the Court stated is the primary goal

226. Id. at *3–5.
227. Id. at *3.
228. Id.
229. Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1998).
230. See id.
231. See Kass, 1995 WL 110368, at *3.
232. Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180 (citing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597
(Tenn. 1992)).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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for courts dissolving these disputes. 238 Though the nature of the dispute
was novel to courts, Kass held that the well-established, common-law
principles governing contract interpretation should be the basis of its
analysis on this issue. 239 The Court found that the parties clearly
manifested their intent in the IVF contract; therefore, the agreement was
valid and enforced. 240 By following the agreement, the embryos would be
donated for research purposes. 241 The ruling of Kass reinforces Davis as
an influential and foundational case for embryo disputes. This is also
evidenced by more recent cases such as In re Marriage of Rooks, In re
Marriage of Dahl and Angle, and McQueen v. Gadberry. 242
B. Embryos as Property of a Special Nature
McQueen v. Gadberry demonstrates how courts in recent years have
adopted the Davis test. 243 McQueen is insightful, as its special designation
for embryos operates similarly to Louisiana’s desire to protect and create
rights for the unborn. 244 Further, its classification scheme of embryos as
marital property of a special character operates similarly to Louisiana’s
juridical personhood classification. In McQueen, the Eastern District of
the Missouri Court of Appeals considered the same policy goals to create
rights for the unborn alongside the parties’ right to privacy and
procreational autonomy. 245 The court not only acknowledged these goals,
but also emphasized the importance of progenitor control. 246 The court
adopted the unique classification of embryos as marital property of a
special nature as a means for progenitors, not the state, to have control
over their personalized family plans. 247
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 182.
241. Id.
242. In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579 (Colo. 2018) (following Davis’s
balancing test yet not agreeing that adoption is a reasonable method of
parenthood); In re Marriage of Dahl & Angle, 194 P.3d 834, 842 (Or. Ct. App.
2008) (citing Davis as persuasive by stating, “[I]t is just and proper to dispose of
the embryos in the manner that the parties chose at the time that they underwent
the IVF process”); McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, 144–45 (Mo. Ct. App.
2016) (relying upon the balancing test set forth in Davis to weigh each party’s
rights of procreational autonomy).
243. See generally McQueen, 507 S.W.3d 127.
244. See id.
245. Id. at 142.
246. See id. at 144.
247. See id.
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The court in McQueen contemplated a similar question to that of
Vergara: whether embryos are children under the applicable state law. 248
McQueen and Gadberry married in 2005, and shortly after their nuptials,
Gadberry was deployed to Iraq. 249 Though the couple did not have fertility
issues, they discussed using IVF as a way to have children while the
husband was deployed. 250 When the spouses created embryos in 2007,
they had not contracted an agreement regarding the number of embryos to
be created, the time implantation would occur, or what the spouses would
do with excess or unused embryos. 251 After IVF, the couple had four
embryos, and two were successfully implanted. 252 As a result, McQueen
became pregnant and gave birth to twin boys in November 2007. 253 The
parties separated in September 2010. 254 In the divorce proceedings,
McQueen and Gadberry contested the appropriate manner of disposition
for the two remaining, unused embryos. 255
McQueen sought usage of the embryos to have more biological
children. 256 McQueen argued that because life begins at the moment of
conception under Missouri law, the moment the sperm and egg fertilized
into an embryo constituted conception, and, thus, the two remaining
embryos should be classified as children. 257 Conversely, Gadberry wished
to donate or destroy the embryos, as he did not want additional children
with McQueen. 258 Usage of the embryos against his consent would force
him into procreation, allegedly violating his constitutional rights to
privacy and equal protection. 259 The trial court classified the remaining
embryos as marital property of a special character and awarded the
embryos jointly to McQueen and Gadberry. 260 In doing so, the trial court
applied a contemporaneous-mutual-consent approach—neither party
could dispose, donate, or use the embryos without the consent of the other
party. 261 On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals considered whether,
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id. at 137–38.
Id. at 133.
Id.
Id. at 134.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 135–36.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 136–37.
Id. See discussion infra note 267.
McQueen, 507 S.W.3d at 137.
Id.
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under Missouri law, embryos pre-implantation were persons and whether
this classification imposes on one’s constitutional rights of the right to
privacy. 262
Gadberry argued that classifying an in vitro embryo as a person would
deny him of “his constitutional right to privacy, right to be free from
governmental interference, and right not to procreate,” to which the court
agreed. 263 In coming to this conclusion, the court referenced years of
established precedent in which the U.S. Supreme Court had recognized a
constitutional right to personal privacy. 264 This privacy extends to
“intimate activities and decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, and family relationships.” 265 The right to procreational
autonomy is “inherent in the U.S. Constitution’s concept of personal
liberty . . . [as] a citizen has the right to be free from governmental
interference with his or her procreational decisions.” 266 Within this
procreational autonomy, individuals have the right to procreate or not
procreate. 267 The court clarified that because the embryo was in vitro and
had not yet been implanted, McQueen was not pregnant. 268 Therefore, the
parties were seen as equivalent gamete providers. 269
The court conducted a balancing analysis of each parties’ respective
rights as it pertains to the embryos. 270 While McQueen had the right to
procreate, this “does not mean [McQueen] ha[d] a right to procreate with
Gadberry by implanting the frozen pre-embryos which contain[ed] his
genetic material.” 271 Not granting the embryos to McQueen would not

262. Id.
263. Id. at 143.
264. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973)). Though Dobbs v.
Jackson Women’s Health Organization struck down Roe v. Wade, the individual
right to personal privacy remains embedded in Supreme Court precedent, which
the Davis court also relied upon in making its ruling. See Griswold v. Conn., 381
U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d
707 (N.J. 2001); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
265. McQueen, 507 S.W.3d at 143.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 144.
268. Id. at 145. In its balancing test, the court noted that McQueen’s
reproductive rights under Roe are not greater than Gadberry’s interest to avoid
fatherhood. Though Roe and Casey have been struck down, the point remains that
prior to implantation, progenitors are equal, and each have their own fundamental
rights to procreational autonomy.
269. Id. at 144 (citing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 600–03 (Tenn. 1992)).
270. See generally id. at 145.
271. Id. 145–46 (emphasis added).
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irrevocably extinguish her right to procreate. 272 Conversely, granting
McQueen usage of the embryos “would impose unwanted parenthood on
Gadberry, with all of its possible life-long emotional, psychological, and
financial responsibilities.” 273 In doing so, Gadberry’s right not to procreate
would be irrevocably extinguished if he is forced into parenthood against
his will. 274
In commencing its analysis of whether embryos are children under
Missouri law, the Missouri Court of Appeals acknowledged that the
unborn are considered persons for purposes of criminal and civil
liability. 275 However, this interpretation has been limited to an embryo in
utero, meaning when an embryo is inside of the womb. 276 In this case, the
embryos were not in utero but in vitro, as the embryos were still
cryogenically stored and not yet implanted into McQueen’s uterus. 277
Therefore, since the relevant statutes did not imply an extension to in vitro
embryos, the court concluded that embryos are not children. 278
While the court quickly dispelled McQueen’s argument of in vitro
embryos as children, it supported the trial court’s classification of embryos
as marital property of a special character. 279 In Missouri, marital property
is “all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage.” 280
Further, property is “[a]ny external thing over which the rights of . . .
use . . . are exercised.” 281 As demonstrated, the distinction between in
vitro and in utero was pivotal for the court’s understanding that embryos
pre-implantation are not persons. 282 This distinction remained important
in finding that in vitro embryos being an external thing acquired during
marriage subjects embryos to a property classification. 283 However,
because of the embryos’ potential for human life, the appellate court
supported the trial court’s finding that embryos should be treated with
additional care. 284 The court reasoned, “Though frozen pre-embryos may
272. Id. at 146.
273. Id. at 147.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 140–41.
276. Id. at 144.
277. Id. at 141.
278. Id. at 147–48.
279. Id. at 142.
280. Id. at 148 (citations omitted) (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 452.330 (2022)).
281. Id. 148–49 (alteration in original) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1232 (7th ed. 1999)).
282. Id. at 137.
283. Id. at 148.
284. See id. at 149.
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never realize their biologic[al] potential, even if implanted, they are unlike
traditional forms of property . . . because they are comprised of . . . genetic
material, are human tissue, and have the potential to become born
children.” 285 Ultimately, the court affirmed the ruling of the trial court that
embryos were aptly classified as property of a special character and any
action regarding its disposition or usage must be consented to by both
parties. 286 The rationale of McQueen is valuable to Louisiana. In resolving
embryo disputes, the McQueen court gave special treatment to embryos
due to an embryo’s potential for life while also acknowledging the
importance of the progenitors’ intent. 287 To remedy Louisiana’s current
application, the legislature should follow this framework.
C. The Louisiana Property Classification in Application and Why It
Would Not Work
An assessment of how a property classification would operate in
Louisiana illustrates existing gaps in the current Human Embryo Statutes.
Namely, glaring issues exist regarding the rights of progenitors and dispute
resolution. However, a property classification would still require
substantial efforts to resolve these issues. Further, it would be inadequate
given the intent and purpose of the Louisiana Human Embryo Statutes.
1. The Difficulties of Classifying Embryos as Property in Louisiana
In classifying embryos as property, embryos would be corporeal
movables. Embryos will likely fall into this category because there is a
physical and visual component to an embryo’s existence. 288 While
embryos are much smaller than the typical corporeal movable, embryos
can be seen and moved. 289 The progenitors or donees of an embryo would
be co-owners of the embryos in indivision. 290 An embryo is comprised of
one-half sperm and one-half ova; therefore, the progenitors’ co-ownership
follows the standard presumption of an equal half-interest. 291
Co-owners determine the use and management of the embryo if both
parties agree. 292 Therefore, the co-owners can legally contract how they
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Id. at 149 (citing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 596–97 (Tenn. 1992)).
Id. at 149.
Id. at 145–46.
See YIANNOPOULOS & SCALISE, supra note 51, § 2:15.
Id.; LA. CIV. CODE art. 471 (2022).
See LA. CIV. CODE art. 797 (2022).
Id.; Mergele-Rust, supra note 162, at 524.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 801 (2022).

402

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

intend to use the embryo. 293 If embryos are classified as property rather
than a juridical person, there would be fewer concerns about whether
contracting around embryos is viable per public policy. The human body
and its parts are generally not categorized within a property regime; these
are objects of a comprehensive right of personality. 294 Nevertheless, blood,
plasma, hair, and organs separated from the human body are things and
objects of property rights. 295 This would likely eliminate many of the
public policy concerns of contracting around a person.
Additionally, property is subject to Louisiana’s successions laws. 296
Co-owners can contract around their property, and as a result, the owner
or co-owner of embryos can explicitly state in their wills who the embryos
would secede to in the event of death. 297 If the co-owners do not have a
will at the time of death, the succession of the embryo would follow the
standard rules of intestate successions. 298 The embryos would be
succeeded to the heirs of one’s descendants, ascendants, or collaterals by
blood or by adoption. 299
However, IVF often occurs between married spouses. 300 Under a
property classification, embryos may be subject to the community
property regime. This would create further issues for embryo disputes.
Some scholars have already contemplated how division would operate
under a community property regime. 301 Valuation issues emerge with this
analysis because the value of frozen embryos exists solely to those who
have contributed to its creation. 302 To suggest that after divorce existing
embryos may be sold for cash would be met with shock and serious public
policy concerns. 303 Therefore, courts would inevitably adopt a division
strategy to give the embryos to one or both spouses. 304 If the number of
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id.
YIANNOPOULOS AND SCALISE, supra note 51, § 1.2.
Id.
See LA. CIV. CODE art. 807 (2022).
Id. art. 801.
Id. art. 807.
Id. art. 880.
New figures show how different people are using IVF, HUMAN
FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., https://www.hfea.gov.uk/about-us/newsand-press-releases/2020-news-and-press-releases/new-figures-show-how-differ
ent-people-are-using-ivf/ [https://perma.cc/HYU3-GP75] (last visited Sept. 10,
2022). Though most patients freezing eggs had no partner (55%), heterosexual
couples account for 88% of patients thawing their frozen eggs for treatment. Id.
301. See generally Fischer, supra note 161, at 262.
302. Id. at 266.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 267.
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remaining embryos is even, the embryos may be divided equally since
equal status is the ideal division of property. 305 However, if the number of
embryos is odd, courts could reserve jurisdiction over all of the embryos
and then dispose of the embryos one at a time to one or both ex-spouses in
equal numbers until a pregnancy occurs. 306
Other scholars believe that if ovum are considered property, the
biological female will have a greater interest in the embryo.307 An embryo
consists of one-part egg and one-part sperm. 308 At the time of birth,
biological females are born with all of the eggs they will have for their
entire life. 309 Eggs may be considered separate property, as a woman
acquired the eggs prior to marriage. 310 The egg a female provides
constitutes 50% of the genetic information. 311 If eggs are considered
separate property, courts could reason that the biological female owns a
50% property interest in each embryo. 312 Conversely, male sperm are
continually produced throughout his life. 313 Since sperm are created during
the marriage, sperm may be considered community property under the
statutory definition. 314 As a result, the 50% interest that the sperm has in
the pre-embryo would be divided in half, with 25% awarded to the female
and 25% awarded to the male. 315 Therefore, the female would have a 75%
property interest and the male could have a 25% property interest. 316
2. The Challenges of Embryos Within the Community Property
Regime
While classifying embryos within the community property regime
may resolve certain components of embryo disputes, it ultimately creates
more questions than answers. Importantly, a community property
approach would be limited to married spouses. IVF as a procedure is not
limited to married spouses but extends to other partners and individuals as
305. Natalie K. Young, Frozen Embryos: New Technology Meets Family Law,
21 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 559, 588 (1991).
306. Fischer, supra note 161, at 267.
307. See Mergele-Rust, supra note 162, at 524–25.
308. Id. at 524.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 525.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
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well. 317 Classifying embryos as community property would create glaring
inconsistencies within the law, as courts would find that formerly married
spouses follow a different analysis than unmarried parties. Further,
distributing embryos to each party illustrates the issue of procreational
autonomy. If one spouse seeks to use their allotted embryos to have
children while the other spouse does not, the non-using spouse must deal
with the consequences of having children against their express consent.
If embryos were to operate as property, courts would need to treat
embryos as an extra-patrimonial asset that is not governed by the
community property regime. 318 However, within a property classification,
courts would be in the same position as they are with Louisiana’s current
approach. As the law stands, there is no clear guidance on how to resolve
embryo disputes. Embryos cannot be partitioned like traditional,
incorporeal movables. Further, the Human Embryo Statutes exist to
provide protection and rights for embryos. 319 A property application
undercuts this purpose. For the Human Embryo Statutes to meet these
expectations, there must be more thorough answers within the provisions.
IV. RESOLVING LOUISIANA’S SCRAMBLED APPROACH
Rather than providing clarity, the current laws on disposition and
resolution of embryo disputes leave progenitors with unanswered
questions. Applying the laws as stated would lead to inconsistent
applications across the state. The legislature can remedy this ambiguity by
codifying a judicial standard for embryo disputes. First, the Louisiana
legislature should revise the Human Embryo Statutes to grant rights to the
progenitors and, in doing so, provide more expansive options for
disposition. Second, the legislature needs to act and revise specific
language in Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:131 to instruct courts to
enforce the agreement between progenitors and, in the absence of such, to
conduct a balancing test based on each party’s interest in the embryo. In
doing so, Louisiana courts should apply a combined contractual-balancing
approach as demonstrated in Davis and Kass. 320

317. Grady, supra note 143.
318. See A.N. Yiannopoulos, Real Rights in Louisiana and Comparative Law:
Part I, 23 LA. L. REV. 161, 161–62 (1963). Patrimonial rights are those subject to
pecuniary evaluation. All rights that are not subject to pecuniary evaluation, such
as “rights of personality” and “family rights” are extra-patrimonial.
319. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:123 (2022); Loeb v. Vergara, 313 So. 3d 346, 391
(La. Ct. App. 4th Cir 2021).
320. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tenn. 1992).
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A. One of These Things Is Not Like the Other: Clarifying What Juridical
Personhood Means in the Human Embryo Statutes and How Courts
Should Respond
While re-classifying embryos as property might remedy some of the
issues that arise with disposition of embryos, such as concerns involving
contracts and ownership, the Louisiana legislature deliberately avoided
this classification. 321 On its face, classifying embryos as juridical persons
with the likes of corporations and associations would appear to be a
misplacement. 322 However, an assessment of the purpose of the Human
Embryo Statutes indicates the legislature’s intent in enacting the statutes
was to create rights for the unborn. 323 In McQueen, the court held that
embryos are property of a special character. 324 Embryos within the
juridical personhood classification operate similar to this, as embryos are
given special rights and care due to their potential for life. McQueen
emphasized the importance of progenitor intent and utilized the balancing
approach in coming to its conclusion. 325 The same approach would work
in Louisiana as well.
A closer look at the intent of juridical personhood classification
demonstrates the value of classifying embryos as juridical persons. As
discussed above, civilian doctrine acknowledges that there are certain
persons with rights who are unable to exercise those rights themselves. 326
In classifying embryos as juridical persons, the legislature intended to
create protections for embryos due to their potential for life.327 While there
is some justification behind this classification, there are still several issues.
First, progenitors are not given sufficient rights to control what happens to
their genetic material. Second, when disputes arise over usage and
disposition of the embryo, the language intended to resolve these disputes
is unclear and would likely result in inconsistent applications. To remedy
this, the legislature should make two adjustments: first, giving progenitors
full disposition rights and opportunities; and second, clarifying the
language of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:131 to adopt the balancing
approach in resolving embryo disputes.
321. See generally LA. REV. STAT. §§ 9:121–133 (2022).
322. See generally id. § 9:126.
323. See generally id.; Vergara, 313 So. 3d at 392; see also Louisiana State
Judiciary A Committee Minutes, May 13, 1986.
324. McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, 149 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
325. See id.
326. STARCK, supra note 30, at 165–66.
327. LA. REV. STAT. § 9:123 (2022); Vergara, 313 So. 3d at 391; see also
Louisiana State Judiciary A Committee Minutes, May 13, 1986.
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The best suited parties for representation of embryos are the
progenitors. The value of an embryo is much more significant to the parties
who plan to use it rather than an IVF clinic or the state. Louisiana currently
recognizes this, as Louisiana law gives progenitors the right of
representation. 328 Usage of embryos is not a significant difficulty when the
progenitors, or intended parties, are able to carry the embryo to term.
However, if the progenitors no longer seek usage of their embryos, there
currently are significant limitations on the opportunities for disposition.
1. The Need for Disposition: Repealing Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 9:129
The limited options for disposition create an increased burden on all
parties involved in the IVF process. 329 While the legislative intent behind
the statutes was to meet the needs of progenitors and create protections for
embryos, these goals are not being achieved by the current legislation.
Section 9:129 states that no viable embryos may be disposed of by the
progenitors. 330 To lessen costs and liabilities, the legislature should repeal
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:129. Instead, progenitors should have
access to the four most common methods of disposal via contract:
(1) reserving the embryos for future use; (2) thawing the embryos with no
further action; (3) donating the embryos to a different couple or individual;
or (4) donating the embryos for research. 331
How progenitors dispose of their genetic material should be
determined by their say and control, not the interests of the state. Providing
a broader array of options for progenitors allows for medical disposal of
embryos that progenitors have no intent of using. Further, progenitor
control of the embryo ensures that the progenitors, as well as IVF clinics,
are no longer responsible for the safekeeping of an embryo that will never
be used. This will likely reduce long-term storage expenses for progenitors
and lessen the burden on IVF facilities. Progenitors may still choose to
store their embryos or donate to another couple, but instead of being forced
into one of these options, they will have a greater say in what happens to
their genetic material. For progenitors to have control, Louisiana should
find embryo agreements containing any of the four primary options above
viable and enforceable in embryo disputes.

328.
329.
330.
331.

LA. REV. STAT. § 9:130 (2022).
Glaser, supra note 111.
LA. REV. STAT. § 9:129 (2022).
See Lin, supra note 102, at 39.

2022]

COMMENT

407

2. Codifying the Balancing Approach in Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 9:131
While Louisiana has established its intention to classify embryos as
juridical persons, it has not made clear how it intends for courts to resolve
these disputes. In embryo disputes, the judicial standard is in the best
interest of the embryo. 332 However, there is no further language or
instruction on what the legislature meant or intended by this best interest
standard. 333 As discussed above, the Human Embryo Statutes reference the
potential parent-child relationship between the progenitors and their
embryos. 334 As a result, when the legislature stated that courts should
determine disputes in the best interest of the ovum, it was likely referring
to the best interest of the child factors used in traditional Louisiana family
law. In family law, the best interest of the child delineates several factors
for courts to consider with child support and custody.335 However, as the
Vergara court also demonstrated, it does not appear that the legislature
intended for embryos to be classified or categorized as children. 336 Further,
scholars believe that an extension of the best interest of the child factors
may be persuasive but largely irrelevant.337 The intent of the best interest
of the child factors listed in Louisiana Civil Code article 134 is “rooted in
maintaining the status quo [of children] and focus[ed] on providing the
child with a sense of stability.” 338 There is no status quo to maintain for
embryos, as embryos do not have a home, school, community, or
emotional ties.339
If the best interest of the embryo automatically means the embryo
should be implanted, substantial issues arise. After divorce, if a biological
female seeks to implant the embryo created during marriage, she is
physically capable of doing so. However, if a biological male seeks to
implant the embryo, he cannot implant the embryo himself nor can he
force the former spouse into implantation. If neither of the progenitors are
physically able to implant the embryo themselves, there are additional
hurdles with Louisiana’s current laws on surrogacy. Gestational
surrogacy, where individuals implant an embryo into a surrogate, is only
permissible when married, heterosexual couples who both provide their
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

LA. REV. STAT. § 9:131 (2022).
See id.
See id. §§ 9:126, 9:130.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 134 (2022); see supra note 136.
Loeb v. Vergara, 313 So. 3d 346, 392 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2021).
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own gametes for creation of the embryo intend to use a surrogate. 340 Since
embryo dispute cases often occur after the marriage has ended, any
progenitor that cannot carry the embryo would not be permitted to use a
surrogate. This result would lead to inequitable application of the statute
if only the biological female is able to implant.
Due to the lack of direction in Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:131,
courts are left without any specific instruction on how to resolve embryo
disputes. To remedy this, the legislature should revise Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:131 to adopt the following language:
In disputes arising between any parties regarding the in vitro
fertilized ovum, the judicial standard for resolving such disputes
is to (a) make a determination based on the common intent of the
parties, and when this is unavailable, (b) perform a fact-intensive
balancing test of each party’s interest.
Courts across varying jurisdictions resoundingly agree that contracts
for the usage and disposition of IVF embryos are valid and essential to
ongoing IVF procedures, even amongst differing classifications of
embryos. 341 To disallow this remedy would create an excessive burden on
the courts in evaluating the intent and interest of the parties, creating
further liabilities on IVF clinics. In McQueen, the court stated that “no
other third party or entity, including a legislature or court, has an interest
sufficient to permit interference with the gamete providers’ decision to
continue, terminate, or suspend the IVF process, ‘because no one bears the
consequences of these decisions in the way that the gamete providers
do.’” 342 As demonstrated through much of the precedent regarding embryo
disputes, decisions as personal and intimate as creating a family are unique
to the individuals involved. 343 The outcomes of such procedures fall
squarely on the progenitors; therefore, it is well within their rights to
contract accordingly.
While contracts are widely acknowledged as an effective solution to
embryo disputes, the fact remains that contracting around an embryo is
significantly different than a typical contractual obligation. Parties endure
a substantial financial burden, physical pains, and emotional labor during

340. See LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2718 (2022).
341. See generally Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.3d. 40, 42 (Tex. App. 2006);
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d
127 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
342. McQueen, 507 S.W.3d at 144 (quoting Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 602).
343. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 599.
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IVF. 344 Many individuals participating in IVF begin the procedure as a last
resort to having biological children. 345 One cannot predict what he or she
may want in the event of divorce. 346 The Davis approach acknowledges
this difficulty by allowing parties whose intentions have changed to amend
their original agreement and have those intentions honored by the court. 347
Otherwise, the court shall conduct a balancing test to determine which
party has a stronger interest in the usage or disposition of the embryo.
To promote judicial efficiency and lessen burdens on parties of
disputes, the Louisiana legislature should adopt specific language deeming
that these contracts should control. In application, this rule should follow
the Davis approach. 348 First, Louisiana courts should allow for the parties’
preferences to control. This approach requires that parties agree on a
result; however, it permits progenitors to change the outcome of their
original agreement. Otherwise, the original agreement controls. This rule
requires progenitors and IVF clinics to seriously weigh their options.
Though one cannot predict the future, progenitors should openly express
their intentions in the event of separation or death of either party.
In cases where there is no contract for the usage of the embryo or
where parties may demonstrate a substantial interest in usage of the
embryo, Louisiana courts should apply Davis’s balancing approach. 349 In
doing so, Louisiana courts weigh the right to procreate against the right
not to procreate. 350 If there are options for a progenitor to have children,
whether through additional IVF procedures or other methods of
reproduction, those opportunities will be weighed accordingly. 351 In the
event there are other viable opportunities, the right not to procreate will
outweigh the right to procreate. As seen in McQueen, a person does have
a right to procreate, but one does not have a right to procreate with an
individual who seeks to avoid parenthood. 352
However, as demonstrated in Davis, there is the possibility that one
party may have a stronger interest in procreation than the other’s right not
to procreate. 353 In these cases, the party that seeks to use the embryo for
procreation should bear the burden of proving they have an interest in the
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), supra note 38.
See Roman, 193 S.W.3d. at 42.
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See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 601.

410

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

embryo that outweighs the right not to procreate, as this right is fairly
settled in the law. 354 In cases in which one party wants to procreate and
one does not, if a court awards the embryo to the party who seeks
procreation, then the party against procreation should be able to forfeit all
duties and rights of parenthood if the party so chooses. This would avoid
the scenario in which the party who wants to use the embryo seeks child
support after the opposite party is expressly against usage of the embryo.
As the law stands, the Louisiana Human Embryo Statutes are not
adequately meeting the needs of progenitors, clinics, and courts for
resolving embryo disputes. Instead of making clear solutions, the current
Human Embryo Statutes raise several questions and concerns. By
eliminating the best interest of the embryo standard in favor of the Davis
test emphasizing progenitor intent, the legislature would ensure that
parties are in control of their genetic material. Further, this ensures that
clinics and courts are not weighed down by needless embryo disputes.
Amending the Human Embryo Statutes creates a clear test for courts to
apply and parties to rely upon.
CONCLUSION
To adequately rule on future cases like Vergara, the Louisiana
legislature must act to create clear, actionable language in Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 9:131 to resolve future disputes, remedy disposition,
and grant progenitors with greater opportunities and rights. If these
proposed changes applied to Vergara, the court would find first that, as
the progenitors, Loeb and Vergara have the sole rights of representation,
usage, and disposal for their embryos. Thus, since both parties agreed to
dispose of the embryo, the contract is valid due to their rights as
representatives. Second, had the disposition agreement not existed, a
Louisiana court would apply the balancing approach in Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:131. Because there is an existing and valid contract, the
original intent of the parties will control. Under these proposed solutions,
Vergara would result in the embryos being thawed with no further action
per the original intent of the parties. With IVF treatments becoming more
accessible, Louisiana needs a solution to ensure progenitors are given the
rights and control over their genetic material and that the state does not
impede with the individuals’ right to procreate—or choice not to. 355 By
changing the Human Embryo Statutes to allow parties to contractually
govern the usage and disposal of embryos, Louisiana solves this problem.
354. Id.
355. Id.

